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GEORGE CREEL AND THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC 
INFORMATION 1917-1918 
 
By Chloe Maxwell 
 
In September of 1916, a relatively unknown Kansas City journalist 
published a short book titled Wilson and the Issues.1 The short book, only 167 
pages in length, was released deliberately in line with President Woodrow 
Wilson’s reelection. Within these pages, author George Creel systematically 
defends Wilson and his first term as president. Creel discusses events such as 
the German occupation of Belgium, the sinking of the Lusitania, and 
Wilson’s neutrality.2 Those familiar with Creel’s work called him a 
professional “muckraker” and an outspoken supporter of the Progressive 
agenda.3 Before war broke out in Europe, Creel advocated for child labor 
reforms, woman’s suffrage, and direct democracy.  
Over the course of World War 1, George Creel created an 
unprecedented propaganda machine that unified the United States behind the 
war. Towards the end of his life, Creel wrote that he felt like his work was his 
patriotic duty to his country, yet, he is still heavily criticized for his wartime 
propaganda. Creel’s actions can be justified by the limited way in which he 
implemented propaganda and censorship.  
The Wilson Administration understood that if the United States 
declared war on Germany, than public support would be crucial to victory.4 
America was not under direct attack, so public opinion would already be 
limited. At this time, the United States was a nation with a deliberately weak 
central government and a diverse population with strong isolationist and anti-
military beliefs. Wilson knew that he would have to unify the country behind 
a war taking place on the other side of the world.5 He had to unify the people 
behind the Wilsonian agenda.  
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 It appears as though Wilson had considered creating a publicity 
agency as early as June 1914. The president hoped a publicity agency would 
clarify the government's position on certain issues Wilson thought were 
important to the American war aims.6 Eight days after Congress passed a 
Declaration of War, Wilson issued Executive Order No. 2594 which created 
the Committee on Public Information (CPI).7 When it came time to select the 
person who would stand at the head of this committee, George Creel was an 
obvious choice for the president.8 Wilson trusted him, and there is no 
indication that he considered anyone else for the job.9 Creel’s loyalty to 
Wilson and Progressivism made him perfect for this position.10 Creel viewed 
it as his job to influence public opinion and to convey the Allies war aims.11 
Creel himself wrote that it was a fight “for the minds of men, for the conquest 
of their convictions” which would allow for “the gospel of Americanism” to 
“be carried out to every corner of the globe.”12 He campaigned not only for 
public support, but also to increase enlistments. He persuaded the American 
people to buy War Bonds and to save their food. It can be said, though, that 
the most important goal of the CPI was to convince the populace that they 
should hate the enemy, which, in this instance, was Germany.13 Creel was an 
idealist, and he strongly believed truth should be the prevailing factor in any 
propaganda. He operated on the theory that when presented with all the facts, 
people would then be able to think for themselves.14 Creel believed that facts 
would persuade the American people that they could make the world secure 
for democracy at the expense of their sons and, temporarily, some of their 
rights.15  
Creel had the daunting task of uniting the nation behind a war they 
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were not completely sure they were ready to support. Creel wrote that in 
order to understand the actions of the CPI a person must first remember the 
deep divisions within the country at the start of the war.16 Historian, Dr. Alan 
Axelrod writes that the divisions Creel points out seem to be factions that are 
essentially synonymous with democracy. People living in a democracy are 
free to think what they wish, rather than be compelled to embrace the ideas of 
a monarch or dictator.17 Creel wrote that the nation needed to somehow find a 
“war-will,” which he defined that as a will to win.18 Axlerod suggests that 
Creel understood the “paradoxical nature of his mission.” Creel was tasked 
with uniting “a democracy [in] the kind of mass behavior that might be 
expected from people under a totalitarian regime, yet do so without 
destroying democracy.”19 The CPI was stuck with a fallacious argument. 
They needed the American people to be on the side of Wilson and they also 
needed Americans to feel free to think what they pleased. Americans are 
sensitive of media censorship. Accordingly, Creel had to find a way to censor 
the media all the while allowing Americans to think their ideas were original 
and not orchestrated by the government.20 The government had two options. 
The first option would be to implement “ironclad censorship” which would 
require government officials to determine what was harmful and what could 
or could not be published. The second option was voluntary censorship, 
which is what Creel ended up implementing.21 From the beginning of his 
career, Creel was strongly against strict censorship legislation. He believed it 
would be too difficult to enforce such laws that legislatures would ultimately 
struggle to codify.22 Creel believed it was “essential in the creation of public 
support for the war through expression, not suppression, of news.”23 Creel 
proposed voluntary censorship.24 He recognized the need for some sort of 
censorship but knew the government would have to attack it from a less 
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obvious angle.25 Creel knew if he could tap into the patriotic nature of 
American newspapermen, then he would possess all the power he would need 
to control the message.26 He made every paper its own censor.27 Creel created 
three categories of information for the newspapers: dangerous, questionable, 
and routine. Dangerous news featured reports on operations being performed 
by the armed forces. Questionable stories were to be published only after the 
approval of the CPI. Almost all the stories that were published contained 
information about everyday events which were considered to be routine and 
those were to be published at the discretion of the newspaper.28  
Creel would continue to say during and after the war that he had no 
official power to enforce censorship. Members of the CPI had no authority to 
arrest anyone who did not comply with their program of voluntary 
censorship. Creel considered this a check to his power. In 1917, Congress 
passed two very important acts: The Espionage and Sedition Acts. These acts 
outlawed any negative criticism of the government and this led to 1,000 
convictions.29 It effectively quieted the opposition.30 It made it punishable by 
law to make slanderous statements about the armed forces, hinder the sale of 
war bonds and enlistments, and for opposing the cause of the United States. 
Before the country entered the war the Department of Justice (DOJ) had 300 
agents posted around the country. A few months into the war they had 
already added another 100. The DOJ also created the American Protective 
League which consisted of everyday Americans who wished to do their part 
on the home front by catching spies. By June of 1917, League members were 
in 600 cities and it is suggested that their numbers were as high as 100,000. 
By 1918, their membership reached 250,000. The Espionage and Sedition 
Acts were the force behind the CPI even if Creel wished not to see it this 
way.
31
 
One of the most vital aspects of Creel’s CPI was the “Four Minute 
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Men.” These men would become the public face of the CPI.32 Local 
volunteers were used to spread the word on the community level. They were 
most famous for speaking to an essentially captive audience at motion 
pictures.
33
It took movie operators four minutes to change film reels.
34
 In these 
four minutes, the Four Minute men were able to update people on events in 
Europe and also share Creel’s message, usually in speeches that lasted no 
more than four minutes. Across the country when people went to a show, a 
slide would appear on the screen which read:  
 
FOUR MINUTE MEN 
[Name of speaker] 
Will speak four minutes on a subject 
of national importance.  
He speaks under the authority of  
THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION  
GEORGE CREEL, CHAIRMAN  
WASHINGTON, D.C.35 
 
Associate Director of the Four Minute Men Division, and Public Speaking 
Professor, Bertram Nelson stated:  
 
How can we reach [the people]? Not through the press, for 
they do not read; not through patriotic rallies, for they do 
not come. Every night eight to ten million people of all 
classes, all degrees of intelligence, black and white, young 
and old, rich and poor, meet in the moving picture houses 
of this country, and among them are many of these silent 
ones who do not read or attend meetings but who must be 
reached.36 
 
It is estimated that in 1917, ten million Americans went to the 
cinema every day.37 In Los Angeles County in 1918, the Four Minute Men 
were able to speak to 1,000 people in less than a weeks’ time.38 The CPI 
recruited 75,000 volunteers who gave approximately 7,500,000 speeches to 
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an estimated 130,000,000 people while the CPI was in existence from 1917-
1918. During this time, there was a common joke that when more than six 
people gathered together it would be a rare thing if a Four Minute Man did 
not arrive to inform them that they needed to buy war bonds, save food and 
fuel, and support the actions of the government.39 The CPI knew they had to 
find a way to spread their message in the most efficient way possible, and the 
Four Minute Men were the answer.40 Bertram Nelson provided them with 
about 30 suggested topics. Nelson also had a speech professional on staff to 
help evaluate and train future four minute men. The speeches were not done 
entirely in English, but were instead spoken in a variety of languages such as: 
Italian, Polish, Lithuanian, Magyar-Hungarian, Russian, Ukrainian, 
Armenian, Bohemian-Slovak, and Yiddish. The program is estimated to have 
cost only $100,000 which was only a small fraction of the CPI’s budget.41  
When Wilson announced the draft in the summer of 1917, the CPI 
set out to support this as well. They viewed their work as successful when on 
the first day of the draft 10,000,000 men signed up and there were no large 
scale riots or public demonstrations like America had seen after a draft was 
announced during the Civil War. Creel, and his men, had no problem with 
taking credit for the large number of people who enlisted after the draft was 
announced.42 
As the Four Minute Men worked on speaking to everyone they 
possibly could, the Division of Pictorial Publicity (DPP) worked to expose 
every American to their form of propaganda. Creel called for the best artists 
from across the country to do their part to fight the war by using their skills to 
help the United States in the war effort. According to Creel, America had 
more posters than any of the countries they were fighting. More importantly, 
American posters were better. Creel realized early on that posters would play 
a large role in what they did and to this effect Creel stated, “The printed word 
might not be read, people might not choose to attend meetings or watch 
motion pictures, but the billboard was something that caught even the most 
indifferent eye.”43  
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The DPP tended to portray the horrors of a possible German 
invasion in their work. In one famous poster it says, “Beat Back the Hun with 
Liberty Bonds.”44 The character can be seen wearing a Prussian helmet called 
a Pickelhaube. The word Pickelhauben comes from the German word Pickel 
meaning point and Haube meaning headgear. It is was helmet worn primarily 
in the nineteenth and twentyith centuries by Prussian military, firefighters and 
police.45This was something that Americans viewed as stereotypically 
Prussian. Ironically, the Prussians had ceased to use this piece of equipment 
in 1916, yet this this is exactly the point. It did not matter that the pictures 
were not accurate. The DPP was able to effectively portray through a poster 
the fears of the average American. They feared that that the Prussians would 
invade, and if they did, they would have to do so with American blood on 
their fingers and bayonets. It told the American people that even though they 
might not be on the battlefield, they could keep the Prussians away by buying 
War Bonds.46  
The artists in the DPP played off the fears felt by the average 
American. Though some, it can be argued, were extremely dramatic, they 
were effective nonetheless. Joseph Pennell’s famous poster depicts Liberty 
Island in New York City under attack.47 He wrote “my idea was New York 
City bombed, shot down, burning, blown-up by the enemy.”48 He originally 
planned to give it the caption “Buy Liberty Bonds or You Will See This.”49 
Millions of Americans believed this was a definite possibility, and the DPP 
knew it and played off this fear. Creel suggested that their success can be 
seen in the fact that more than 20 million people, over half the adult 
population, bought War Bonds. It is estimated that nearly seven billion 
dollars were raised through their sale.50 It would give the DPP too much 
credit to say they were the reason why so many War Bonds were bought, but 
it is reasonable to say they played a large role in this operation.51 
By the time the armistice was signed in November of 1918, the DPP 
had 279 artists and 33 cartoonists on their payroll. Creel estimates 700 posters 
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were created with a total of 1,438 visual works all together.52 This included 
things such as cards for street cars and window displays, items published in 
newspapers, cartoons, and buttons. The message of the DPP told Americans 
to not only buy War Bonds, but also to conserve food, coal and electricity, it 
urged enlistment and support of the Red Cross. The DPP teamed with George 
Creel was a force that showed the American people what the government 
wanted them to think.53 
The publishing machine that Creel created was remarkable. During 
its existence the CPI published approximately 75 million pamphlets. It also 
published the government’s first daily newspaper, The Official Bulletin, 
which at its height in popularity reached 115,000 subscriptions. The Bulletin 
was also distributed to every news office around the country free of charge.54 
To Creel, public opinion was in a way “a weapon of war.” With this in mind, 
it can be seen that Creel’s actions fell completely in line with this opinion.55 
Within one day of the armistice going into effect, orders were sent 
out that called all active CPI campaigns to an end. Creel believed that many 
of the departments within the CPI could be useful in peacetime. He also 
believed that “the Committee was a war organization only, and that it was 
without [a] proper place in the national life in time of peace.”56 He realized it 
did not matter how “honest its intents or pure its purposes,” the CPI operating 
during a time of peace would be viewed as tyrannical in the same way 
Americans viewed a large peacetime standing army.57 The populace was done 
with war and had not completely bought into Wilson’s idea of “peace without 
Victory.”58 Creel believed that the work of the CPI was finished but he was 
not. Creel traveled to Europe with Wilson to work out the President’s dream, 
the League of Nations.59 
When Creel returned to the United States in 1919, he, like Wilson, 
had very few friends in the Republican Congress. Creel planned to take apart 
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the CPI with care, but Congress did not.60 Congress actively tried to discredit 
Creel professionally. George Blakey wrote, “The irony of much of the 
Republican criticism is that it was intended for Wilson [but] aimed at 
Creel.”
61
 Creel wanted to save all the records that he knew would someday be 
important to the story of the CPI but Congress did not think this was 
necessary.62 On June 30, 1919 Congress cut off what was left of the CPI from 
their money supply. In Creel’s memoir he wrote:  
 
Every dollar of our appropriation, every dollar of our 
earnings, was swept back into the Treasury, and the 
Committee itself wiped out of existence, leaving no one 
with authority to sign a check, transfer a bank balance, 
employ a clerk, rent a building, or with any power 
whatsoever to proceed with the business of settlement. The 
action was so utterly mad, and yet…there was nothing we 
could have done about it.63 
 
Creel took it upon himself to save what was left of the CPI. He 
borrowed Army trucks to transport everything to empty space he found 
within the Fuel Administration Building and he rode with every truck load to 
personally oversee the move.64 The offices he found were empty, so he hired 
a security guard at his own expense to watch over the remnants of the CPI.65 
Congress did not let these files stay at this location long. Creel states the files 
were “dumped into trucks for the second time… whatever resemblance of 
orderly arrangement remained was entirely smashed by this last transfer.”66 In 
October of 1919, Congress made allegations against Creel, effectively saying 
he wasted the government's money, and ironically, the tedious records that 
Creel worked hard to save were what cleared his name of these accusations.67 
The only honor Creel ever received in regards to his work with the 
CPI was a personal letter from President Woodrow Wilson. He spent most of 
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the rest of his life out of the public eye, except for a failed run in a California 
Gubernatorial race. Creel continued defending what he did in World War I 
until his death in 1953.68  Arguably, Creel is most famous for saying, “In no 
degree was the Committee an agency of censorship, a machine of 
concealment or repression. Its emphasis throughout was on the open and the 
positive. At no point did it seek to exercise authorities under those laws that 
limited the freedom of speech and press.”69  
The question that remains is whether Creel was the master 
propagandist manipulating the minds of naïve Americans or was he a patriot 
fighting to save democracy. Creel appears to have been some of both. It 
seems as though Wilson was able to find someone who he could not only 
trust but also influence. Even though many criticize his work, none of it was 
illegal or inaccurate. Creel believed he was doing the right thing for the 
country, and this is something scholars agree on. It is more accurate to call 
Creel naïve. He behaved as tough he was blinded by the allure of Wilson’s 
progressive agenda. He was a master of propaganda. Creel used his talents in 
a way that preserved democracy in the best way he could find. Though Creel 
and the CPI definitely used the heightened emotions of a nation during 
wartime to their advantage, they absolutely were successful in uniting a 
majority of the country behind the war. Creel admirably took the initiative to 
dismantle the CPI following the conclusion of WW1. Creel did produce a 
large amount of effective government funded propaganda during WW1, but 
President Wilson should be the one criticized for it, not George Creel.  
According to Axelrod, historians have noticed similarities between 
the way Hitler’s propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, ran the Nazi 
propaganda ministry with the centralized way Creel ran the CPI. Currently, 
there is no way to be absolutely certain about this, but it seems logical that 
Goebbels would have researched the CPI which was the one of the most 
important propaganda agencies during WW1. In 1933, former CPI official, 
Edward Bernays invited the foreign correspondent of the Hearst newspapers, 
Karl von Weigand, to a dinner.70 Barneys reportedly told stories to the other 
guests about Goebbels’ plan to consolidate Nazi power. Goebbels, who 
would soon after be appointed head of Hitler’s propaganda ministry, showed 
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Weigand his extensive library, which included all of the best works on 
propaganda, the most extensive collection Weigand had ever come across. 
Goebbels told Weigand he was particularly fond of Bernay’s 1923 book, 
Crystallizing Public Opinion. He used the book “as a basis for his destructive 
campaign against the Jews of Germany.”71 Hitler also wrote in Mein Kampf 
that “it was not until the [First World War] that it became evident what 
immense results could be obtained by a correct application of propaganda.”72 
It does not appear to be too much of a stretch then to suggest that high level 
Nazi officials were familiar with Creel’s success in propaganda in WW1.73  
In January of 1939, an article was published in the Science News 
Letter informing the public that mysterious files were found in the basement 
of an old War Department building in Washington DC. These were the files 
Creel took so much care to preserve.74 The files, since made public, tell the 
story of the CPI and its success in WW1 in a way that the highly-criticized 
Creel never could. The files shed light on a dark time in American history 
when President Wilson felt like a propaganda ministry was completely 
necessary to win WW1. Creel was able to preserve Democracy as best he 
could by convincing Congress and the President that they did not need 
explicit, strict censorship. George Creel was a powerful man, but the 
President was the one with the influence over a man who whole heartedly 
believed that he was a patriot and that he was doing his part to make the 
world safe for democracy.  
The actions George Creel took during WW1 remained controversial 
for the rest of his life. Even now the words propaganda and censorship have a 
dirty connotation, and it is necessary to understand that these things are multi-
faceted. Creel’s WW1 propaganda and censorship were an Americanized 
version. Although it did play off the heightened fears of a nation at war, there 
was no force behind the censorship and propaganda, unlike more renowned 
instances of propaganda, such as the Nazi regime. Because of the lack of 
force behind the propaganda and the context of the time, the evidence found 
in the basement of the War Department are enough to exonerate Creel’s 
record and show that his actions were justified. 
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